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Abstract
This paper sets up two competing frameworks to assess the evidence of the CAP reforms of the
1980s and 1990s. The two frameworks differ in the degree of prominence given to interest groups
in affecting CAP decisions. The paper concludes that the most important mechanism behind CAP
reforms is the interaction of EU institutions and member state governments. Interest groups, at
national or EU-level, have limited influence on the reform process. The paper does not claim to
have developed a new theory of CAP reform but rather aims to suggest a direction for the
development of a high content theory that is able to account for the differences between episodes of
CAP reform as well as the similarities.
Kurzfassung
Dieses Papier stellt zwei konkurrierende Rahmen für die Analyse der Reform der Gemeinsamen
Agrarpolitik (GAP) der 80er und 90er Jahre dar. Die beiden Rahmen unterscheiden sich darin,
wieviel Einfluß den Interessensgruppen auf die GAP-Entscheidungen beigemessen wird. Der
Beitrag kommt zu dem Schluß, daß der wichtigste Mechanismus innerhalb der Reformen die
Interaktion der EU-Institutionen mit den mitgliedstaatlichen Regierungen ist. Das Papier versucht
nicht die Entwicklung einer neuen Theorie der GAP-Reform, sondern zielt vielmehr darauf ab, die
Richtung für die Entwicklung einer mächtigen Theorie aufzuzeigen, die in der Lage wäre, die
Unterschiede ebenso wie die Gemeinsamkeiten der verschiedenen Reformabschnitte zu erklären. 
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I. Introduction 
The agreement to reform the CAP on 11 March 1999 was the fourth reform in 15 years. This paper
aims to contribute to the development of a theory of CAP reform by considering two rival groups of
theories or frameworks; the institutions framework and the interest groups framework. The term
framework is used advisedly to refer to a set of theories that are linked by common assumptions,
themes or concepts. It is a useful term here because the current literature does not offer a
well-developed, high content theory of CAP reform. The paper does not claim to have developed a
new theory of CAP reform but rather aims to suggest a direction for the development of a theory that
is able to account for the differences between episodes of CAP reform as well as the similarities. 
The paper uses the following methodology. The existing literature on theories of agricultural support
and EU-level policy-making is reviewed for each framework. In addition, there is a brief survey of
the evidence of previous CAP reforms in terms of fieldwork interviews reported, primary documents
and contemporary commentaries. From these observables, the paper uses the literature to help make
inferences about the unobservable mechanisms that might explain a CAP reform. Such
unobservables include power, influence, the role of the timing and environment of decisions as well
as the preferences of both individuals and institutional actors involved in a CAP reform. A process of
inference to the best explanation is used to appraise the frameworks, or as Kinach (1996) states it, the
case of selecting the framework 'that explains a greater range of facts than its rival'. This paper holds
that such abductive reasoning, as opposed to a strict hypothetico-deductive method of theory-testing,
is justified in this case because of the limited range of CAP reform evidence and the underdeveloped
nature of existing theories of CAP reform. 
Section II sets out the basic differences between the two frameworks. Section III uses the
methodology above to develop interest group theories of CAP reform. Section IV does the same for
institutions approaches to CAP reform. Section V contains the paper's three broad conclusions. First,
there is little evidence from of interest group influence at an EU-level on either the initiation or
outcome of the CAP reform process. Second, at a national level there is some evidence that the
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interaction of different EU institutions and member state governments is the main dynamic behind a
reform process; this is where reforms are conceived, constructed and enacted. 
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II. Interest groups framework versus institutions framework 
Egdell and Thomson (1999, p.130) observe that the CAP will ‘…continue to be a key battleground
for the interrelationships between the government and non-government organizations in the
agricultural, environmental and rural development policy arenas.’ Smith (1993) provides a typology
of these interrelationships, running from closed, stable policy communities (Richardson and Jordan,
1979; Mazey and Richardson, 1993) which have been applied to the EU generally and agriculture in
particular (Grant, 1993; Smith, 1990) to open, unstable issue networks (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992. 
The two frameworks presented in this paper differ in their degree of emphasis on the ability of
interest groups to affect decisions to reform the CAP. The interest groups framework gives a
prominent role to interest groups in the CAP reform process. It is based on the claim that the
Commission or individual member states are 'heavily influenced' (Edgell and Thomson (1999, p.122)
by the lobbying of interest groups. The institution framework is based on the premise that the actors
with the greatest influence in the CAP decision-making process are the institutions directly involved,
the Commission and the 15 member states in the Council of Agricultural Ministers (CoAM). 
III. The interest groups framework 
There are two sources for the group of theories that form the interest groups framework. First, there
is a literature of theoretical and abstract work on interest groups that has been applied to the CAP.
Secondly, the history of the development of state support for agriculture at an EU and member state
level has been written in terms of the political strength of farm interest groups. 
3
Agricultural policy is mentioned as an example of successful interest group activity in the following
theoretical works: Olson (1965) argued that farm interest groups had solved the collective action
problem posed by the incentive to free-ride; Stigler (1975) and Becker (1983) described farm groups
as successful in the political market for rent-creating interventions by government; Hirschman (1970)
used farm interest groups to illustrate his concept of ‘exit and voice’. In all these works, the farm
lobby is cited as an example of a well-organised, disciplined group able to exert political influence.
Brooks (1996) provides a survey of the formal political economy models of agricultural policy
developed within the interest groups framework. 
This literature is divided on the relative importance of interest groups and individual voters in
analysing rent-seeking behaviour. In particular, Brooks (1995, 1996) and De Gorter and Swinnen
(1994, 1995) have disagreed on the issue of whether voters are rationally ignorant of the effects and
the costs of agricultural policies. Downs (1957) described the rationally ignorant voter in a situation
where the benefits of. government interventions are concentrated but their costs are widely spread.
The more diffuse is the incidence of the costs of the intervention, the less incentive there is for the
individual voter to learn about that issue. The voter remains rationally ignorant. 
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central to an understanding of why most OECD countries subsidise their farmers...’. The application
of economics to politics has consistently produced the conclusion that the information flow in the
democratic process is filtered and noisy when compared to the economic market (see inter alia Riker,
1982). Voting is infrequent, one vote encompasses a series of issues, and everyone votes not just
those directly associated with the decision. In the economic market agents do not vote on matters of
no particular interest to them. Further, information is relatively in an economic market. This kind of
market is a superior mechanism for revealing sovereign preferences, because people feel the full cost
and benefit of their decision (assuming there are no externalities). In a world of rationally ignorant
voters, interest groups are the key actors in the political system. Through collective action they
produce support for politicians and receive rent-creating interventions in return. In his model of
interest groups, Becker (1983, p.372) notes ‘voter preferences are not a crucial independent (author's
italics) force in political behaviour’. Instead, it is the observation that farm interest groups are
relatively more efficient (compared with other interest groups) at producing political pressure that
explains the structure of agricultural policies in OECD countries. 
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De Gorter and Swinnen (1994, 1995) argue that the activities of interest groups are not a fundamental
factor in determining the structure of agricultural policies across OECD countries. Voters are
rational, self-interested and fully informed about agricultural policies, rather than rationally ignorant.
An understanding of the nature of agricultural policies in the OECD requires an analysis of the
interaction of political support-seeking politicians and support-supplying voters. The politician-voter
link is more important than the politician-interest group link(1).
The second source of support for the interest groups framework has been the histories of state
support for European agriculture including the CAP. These have emphasised the influence of interest
groups as critical in understanding past policy decisions. Tracy (1989) and Milward (1992) trace the
construction of a common agricultural policy in terms of the political influence of national farm
groups. The history of UK agricultural policy from 1947 to 1973 is told in Self and Storing (1962),
Smith (1990), and Tracy (1989) as the history of the political strength of the National Farmers Union
(NFU). 
These histories also detail a system of institutional arrangements set up to provide a regular and
routine interface between the farm lobby and government. Institutions are highlighted as an important
factor in explaining the persistent influence of farm interest groups. A basic assumption of the
interest groups framework is that, ‘...the major farm policies survive because of the particular sets of
institutions involved in the setting of policy and the structure of the decision framework which they
operate, as well as the pressure from interest groups’ (Moyer and Josling 1990, p.45). 
Prominent interest groups enjoy the political power to influence decisions or in the limiting case to
force decisions to be made or not made. However, an integral part of their influence is the privileged
institutional access they enjoy. Their relationships with the institutions of the state are central to
understanding agricultural policy. Institutions matter because they affect ‘...the structure, scope and
character of activity by interest organisations’ (Grant 1993, p.44). 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) and Mazey and Richardson (1993) describe a policy community as
having the following characteristics: membership is limited to a small number of state institutions
and interest groups; the members interact frequently and across all aspects of policy; there is a high
degree of consensus as to the means and ends of policy in the particular area covered by the
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In terms of an agricultural policy community, the fact that a farm group’s absolute political strength
may have declined does not necessarily affect their influence, because they do not have to compete
with other groups for government’s attention and financial support. Schmitt (1986: 342) highlights
the ‘absence of effective checks restricting and repressing the unilateral influence and pressure of the
agricultural sector’. 
Any attempt to describe the CAP decision-making system as a policy community starts from the
point that it will be more extensive and complex than the relationship between a national ministry
and its national client groups (e.g. farm groups, food processors, agribusiness interests,
environmental interests). Interest groups affected by the CAP are in a two-level game because they
have two lobbying arenas; at the national level and the European level (Putnam 1988). The national
level refers to the lobbying of member states’ vote in the CoAM. The second refers to lobbying the
Commission directly through membership of umbrella organisations, the most important of which is
the Comité des Organisations Professionelles Agricoles (COPA). These two sets of relationships
provide a wider policy community than those that exist in national policy arenas. The different
strategies for the two levels of lobbying are discussed in Grant (1993) and Averyt (1977). 
The literature on COPA provides the insight that COPA has a role in the bureaucratic functioning of
the extant CAP system. It usually has 50% of the membership of the Commission’s advisory,
management and regulatory committees that exist for each of the CAP product regimes. Hence Smith
(1990) states, ‘COPA’s relationship with DG VI is...very close’. Further, these different committees
can sometimes take decisions of major political consequence. Blumann and Adam (1997) describe
how the actions of the comitology committees of the CAP ignited the BSE crisis in March 1996. 
However, Petit et al (1987), Tracy (1989), Moyer and Josling (1990), Mahé and Roe (1996), and Kay
(1998) in presenting their evidence of the reforms of the CAP in the 1980s and 1990s do not give
COPA any role at all. COPA was forced to react to a CAP reform agenda and was unable to agree a
response to the proposals promulgated by the Commission in 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1997. It can
therefore be inferred that COPA had very little influence on the outcome of those CAP reforms. If
COPA has strong links with certain parts of DG VI and representation on the various committees of
the Commission, this does not seem to have extended to having a position in any policy community
on the issue of CAP reform. This conclusion leaves open the question of the extent to which
agricultural policy interest groups can influence the behaviour of the relevant national ministry. This
question is also central to the institutions framework so discussion of it is deferred to the next
section. 
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IV. The institutions framework 
The central element of the institutions framework is that the institutional context of the pressures for
CAP reform is important in understanding a CAP reform. The institutions of CAP decision-making
rather than interest groups, are the transmission mechanisms from the pressures to reform the CAP to
the enactment of certain CAP reforms at certain times. The position taken by national representatives
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and that supporting agriculture is their department’s raison d’être. Institutional structures rather than
the influence of interest groups determines agency behaviour. 
Peterson (1995) charts the rise of a new institutionalism, ‘EU institutions may develop their own
agendas and act autonomously of allied interest groups’ (Peterson, 1995, p.81). Interest groups will
have access to these institutions, but this does not equate to genuine influence in a reform situation.
This is not to argue that state institutions enacting agricultural policy do not wish to have the support
of agricultural policy interest groups, rather the claim is that agricultural policy interest groups do not
hold the resources necessary to influence or veto the CAP reform process. 
For the institutions framework to be applied to the CAP decision-making system, it is not necessary
to argue that a policy community does not exist. The term policy community was originally
developed to argue that groups had significant resources and could limit the extent of state autonomy;
the existence of a policy community was an illustration of a lack of state autonomy. Richardson and
Jordan (1979) provide a detailed account of this view. However, Smith (1993) re-interprets the
existence of policy communities as evidence of the autonomy of state institutions. The agenda of the
policy community and the mediation of different views within it are dominated by state institutions.
By establishing these communities with affected interest groups, state institutions actually increase
their capacity to act autonomously. 
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The central institution of CAP decision-making is the CoAM. Fifteen agriculture ministers formally
enact any CAP reform, hence all factors and mechanisms involved in the CAP reform process must
be traced back from that point. Any account of a CAP reform should put the members of the CoAM
into their political context (at both domestic and EU level). This will afford an understanding of their
bargaining positions and ‘domain of feasible compromise’ (Petit et al 1987). 
Formally, the Commission controls the agenda of the CoAM. It enjoys the sole right to propose
legislation, and for the CoAM to agree something different from an initial Commission proposal
requires unanimity or the consent of the Commission. Hence the Commission creates a reform
situation by the proposal of reform. Peterson (1995) calls these ‘meso-level’ decisions. The ability to
control the agenda is also the ability to affect the final policy outcome, even if the power of
enactment exists elsewhere. The CAP reforms that are enacted are shaped by the reforms proposed. 
These meso-level decisions are not the exclusive preserve of the Commission: there is the question of
the circumstances in which the Commission will propose a reform, i.e. exercise the policy-shaping
function. The decision to promulgate reform proposals must to some extent be based on a political
calculation of what the CoAM will agree. Further, in the reforms of 1984 and 1988, the European
Council was active in forcing a CAP reform agenda on the CoAM. It is clear from the CAP reform
accounts in Petit et al (1987), Moyer and Josling (1988), Mahé and Roe (1996), and Kay (1998) that
what motivated the proposal of CAP reforms by the Commission is not necessarily linked to what
prompts the final enactment of reform by the CoAM or the European Council. 
Bulmer and Wessels (1987) argue that the European Council has increasingly been forced into the
role of ‘Court of Appeal’, as was the case in the reforms of 1984 and 1988, by failures in the EU
decision-making system. They note the lack of a co-ordinating institution between various Councils.
As public policies have become increasingly complex, they have traversed the functional divisions of
the Councils, e.g. the spillover of agricultural policy issues into trade, foreign affairs and budget
areas. The European Council does not co-ordinate - it has no regular agenda and does not allocate
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battles’ with each other with the issues of greatest contention pushed up to European Council level
for resolution. This was not the case in reforms of 1992 and 1999 and poses a challenge for the
development of a coherent theory of CAP reform. 
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When a factor is specified as a cause of a CAP reform it is necessary to state where and what the
incidence of that factor is, in particular, how it affects the Commission, the Commission’s
calculations about the Council, and the Council. Further, the reform process is generally long (over a
year for the reforms of 1984 and 1988 and nearly two years for 1992 and 1999) and decisions are
made by different institutions at different times. Thus, even if it is claimed that same factor affects all
institutions, it affects them at different times and in different circumstances. 
CAP reforms start with the Commission and end with the CoAM. It is these two institutions which
determine the characteristics of the reform process and the reform outcomes. The Commission
provides part of the explanation of why the reform of the CAP tends to be drawn out and reforms
incremental. DG II (Economics) and DG XIX (Budget) have wrestled (unsuccessfully) with DG VI
for control of the CAP agenda. Further, the horizontal separation of DG VI by commodity division
hampers the internal construction of reform proposals. Reforms are conceived in small groups and
cliques away from the main policy or administrative channels of DG VI. The role of Commissioners’
cabinets was a material factor in each of the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. 
The CoAM is pro-agriculture because its members are politicians who bring the perspective of
incumbent ministers of agriculture. The influence of agricultural policy interest groups in
policy-process is much less than the influence of this basic institutional fact. The source of
explanation of CAP reform lies in why a qualified majority of members (at some time) are
constrained to accept the inevitability of reform. 
There are two ways to infer that the institutional context dominates the pressure of interest groups as
a motivating factor in a national government’s position on a proposed CAP reform. The first
emphasises that each member of the CoAM is a member of a national government, which has to
agree at an executive level a negotiating position for the minister of agriculture to adopt in the
CoAM. Swinbank (1989), in a UK context, quotes Peter Walker from 1981 as saying that the
Secretary of State for Agriculture never negotiates beyond his brief agreed with Cabinet (including
the Chancellor of the Exchequer). Walker regarded the view of the CoAM as a group of agriculture
ministers who push up farm prices, oblivious or indifferent to the effect on the EU budget as a ‘great
myth’. 
9
Walker’s point is that because the position taken in the CoAM has to be agreed collectively by each
national government, this will constrain the ability of the CoAM to expand the budget of the CAP.
The key institutional point is that the position taken in the CoAM is that of the UK government, and
not the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). Interest groups have to compete with
other ministries and their client interest groups for control of the UK government’s position on the
CAP. 
Petit et al (1987) and Moyer and Josling (1990) describe the existence of national agricultural policy
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more recently Epstein (1997) and Von Cramon-Taubadel (1993) argue that the policy process for
agriculture in France and Germany respectively can no longer be accurately described or analysed
using the concept of a policy community. The evidence from policy towards the CAP and the GATT
in the 1990s was that the access of traditionally powerful farm interest groups was no longer
exclusive, there was no longer a broad and stable consensus on agricultural policy and, crucially,
agricultural policy-making had become heavily politicised. Epstein (1997) explains this last point in
terms of the end of ‘programme sectorization’, the situation where ministry officials and the principal
unions could deal with a clearly circumscribed agricultural agenda without reference to the effect on
other political or economic interests. 
The need for each member state to allow their representative to ‘play the CoAM game’ allows a
second inference that institutional context rather than interest group pressure is more important in
determining the preferences of national representatives. The enactment of previous CAP reforms has
not required the agreement of all fifteen member states. Instead, reforms have occurred when France
and Germany have agreed on a set of proposals. In such circumstances, any other view of CAP
reform will tend to get out-voted. The game of the CoAM is to maximise your view of the national
agricultural interest in the context of the reform likely to be agreed upon by a qualified majority
(usually including France and Germany). The dynamics of this political manoeuvring are beyond the
influence or control of national interest groups. Even if they can influence a member states’ initial
bargaining position, it is unlikely that they can influence the compromise process as each member
state seeks to maximise its payoff from the CAP reform package that is about to be agreed. 
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In this framework, members of the CoAM are pro-agriculture in the sense of defending the existing
CAP system. This is the baseline against which any incumbent measures success at the job. To allow
reform would be a surrender of what some earlier minister of agriculture (or themselves) had
negotiated for their nation’s farm interest. The surrender of the status quo is a political cost. This
defensive posture means that the CoAM has been characterised as myopic (Petit et al 1987).
Preserving the CAP, and their nation’s pay-off, will tend to be the opening negotiating stance of each
member of the CoAM. 
V. Conclusion 
The evidence of the last 15 years does not seem to support the inference that EU-level interest groups
have had a significant influence on the reform of the CAP, either in terms of the timing or content of
the reforms. Further, there is evidence that the influence of national farm groups on national
governments in the CAP reform process is declining in important member states, such as France and
Germany. Other interests, notably the pressure of international trade negotiations and the
concomitant domestic business interest, have become more influential. This paper argues that the
influence of institutions is a more appropriate inference from the evidence of the CAP reform
process; the group of theories in the institutions framework explains a greater range of the observable
facts than those theories in the interest groups framework. 
The paper does not claim to have arrived at a theory of CAP reform. Instead, it suggests a direction
for the development of such a theory. The criteria proposed by Thaggard (1992); explanatory breadth,
simplicity, and analogy should guide the development a theory of CAP reform. The criterion of
explanatory breadth captures the idea that a theory is a better explanation than its rivals are if it
explains a greater range of facts. The notion of simplicity is captured by the idea that preference
should be given to theories that make fewer special assumptions. Finally, explanations are judged
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Endnotes
(*) The author would like to thank the two anonymous referees of the EIoP for their comments.
(1) This paper considers the influence of state institutions as an alternative to interest group influence
on CAP decisions. Both may influence public opinion but it is difficult to disentangle empirically this
effect from any independent effect of public opinion. Further, whilst there is some evidence of
interest group influence on CAP decisions there seems to be no evidence of public opinion having an
effect. Therefore, the politician-voter link is ignored in this paper.
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